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Abstract
This paper argues that while platforms 
such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter 
are unquestionably allowing some young 
citizens in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region quicker, easier and 
greater access to job opportunities and 
likeminded groups and citizens inside 
and outside the region, class-based digi-
tal divides exist, scepticism of  new media 
remains, online surveillance and harass-
ment are rife, and social media fatigue is 
common. Existing community structures, 
creativity and emerging media remain 
important for youth participatory civic 
networks in Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
Communities, local neighbourhoods, pri-
vate and public spaces, and commercial 
media cultures vie for position in young 
people’s social worlds and civic identi-
ties. Young Emiratis, expats, Jordanians, 
Jordanian Palestinians, Moroccans and 
Tunisians practice their political values 
and social relationships in networks that 
are strongly inflected by social class and 
gender. Indigeneity, race and sexual-
ity also inflect the cultural histories and 
practices on which young people in the 
region draw. Individual charisma, self-ex-
ploitation, arts and crafts, old media tools 
and local friendship or kinship networks 
are still the basis for much civic solidarity, 
political trust, critique and creative dis-
semination in the MENA region. This has 
profound implications for technologically 
oriented protest narratives, for discussions 
of  personalisation, and for democracy.
The research for this paper was conducted as part of  a 
collaboration project ‘Personalised Media and Participa-
tory Culture’ between LSE and the American University 
in Sharjah (AUS). The project was funded by the LSE 
Collaboration with Arab Universities Programme, sup-
ported by the Emirates Foundation. We would like to 
acknowledge the input of  our co-Investigator Moham-
med Ibahrine at AUS, and of  Robert Lowe and Chelsea 
Milsom in the LSE Middle East Centre. We would 
also like to thank our unknown reviewer and Ribale 
Sleiman Haidar for helpful comments on the paper.
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Introduction
Animated by debates about whether and how new and emerging media and social media 
platforms are altering communication, culture and community amongst young people 
aged 15 to 35 in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, the research project 
on which this paper draws set out to contextualise the role of  older more embedded media 
forms, such as graffiti and television, and the role of  offline communities of  practice in 
networked participation. In this paper, we focus on four countries, Jordan, Morocco, Tuni-
sia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which exemplify contrasting histories and types 
of  governance, and variable internet penetration rates and population income levels. We 
do so guided by two interlinked research questions: First, what kinds of  community networks, 
participatory cultures and civic engagements are exhibited by the youth populations of  Jordan, Morocco, 
Tunisia and the UAE? And second, has the availability of  new media altered existing participatory 
cultural networks, affordances and civic spaces? These questions focus on the ways in which com-
munities of  young citizens interact with each other and with civic and political cultures 
across the four countries. They aim to investigate the depth, avenues for, and types of  par-
ticipation, as well as the meanings and constraints on different types of  networks, and the 
significance or irrelevance of  class and gender in conceptualising networked participation 
in the contrasting MENA countries. 
All our chosen countries have a significant urban population, a high number of  university 
graduates and relatively substantial levels of  technology access (indicated here by inter-
net users: Jordan 53.4 percent, Morocco 57.1 percent, Tunisia 48.5 percent and UAE 
91.2 percent).1 Politically, however, the four countries show relevant differences. While 
Morocco and Jordan have similar political systems of  ruling monarchies and elected par-
liaments with limited powers, Tunisia is transitioning from the authoritarian rule of  Ben 
Ali following the Arab Spring, and the UAE is a federal presidential monarchy governed 
by ruling elites. The UAE, with an annual gross domestic product (GDP) of  $377 billion,2 
can be regarded as a high-income country despite the fact that it is also home to a large 
number of  exploited foreign workers whose wages do not correspond to this data. 
Given this diversity of  contexts, we designed our research in iterative cycles to include 
fact checking, analysis of  existing statistics on participation and internet use in the region, 
and critical literature reviews. Desk research was intentionally interspersed with and chal-
lenged by field research, and methodological encounters with our research rssistants (RAs) 
and other key scholars in the field. Our four young RAs in the region attended an intensive 
three-day methodological and ethics training workshop in London. During this period, 
we focused on training them in qualitative research practice as well as on discussing polit-
ical and ethical contexts. Banaji’s experience doing ethnographic work with children and 
1  ‘Internet Users (per 100 people)’, UNdata (2015). Available at http://data.un.org/Data.aspx-
?d=WDI&f=Indicator_Code%3AIT.NET.USER.P2.
2  The World Bank Data (2015). Available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-arab-emirates.
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youth in India and Europe3 and Moreno Almeida’s work with rappers in Morocco and 
her knowledge of  the region’s cultural scenes4 provided fruitful models for the training. 
Between September 2016 and March 2017, our RAs collected in-depth qualitative data 
with the aim of  shedding light on the national, local and regional contexts of  new media 
linked to participation, creativity and networking. Interview questions focused on the 
depth and types of  participation in civil, religious, political and other networks offline, 
and the extent to which emerging digital platforms can be – or already are – transforming 
young people’s identities as performers, artists, activists and citizens. Our research was 
planned around a series of  contrasting ethnographic case studies. Each study illustrates 
the peculiarities of  an organically connected or diffuse set of  young people involved in an 
overtly or covertly political cause, artistic production, popular social movement or social 
enterprise that uses both old and new media for communication and connection. These 
cases include: football ultras, a teacher trainees’ union, Sufi music performers and mem-
bers from the film scene in Morocco; cultural networks and spaces, a mobile bookshop, 
refugees and metal music networks in Jordan; feminists, LGBTQI, #manich_msamah 
movement, and gamers’ networks in Tunisia; and motorbike networks, musical and theat-
rical ventures, counselling and self-disclosure and digital podcasting networks in the UAE. 
All the cases emerged out of  a systematic mapping of  the civic spheres in each country 
through literature searches as well as on and offline discussions.  Civic network diagrams 
were created which charted connections between different offline and online commu-
nities, and demonstrated the prevalence of  particular nodes and networks; as such, these chosen 
networks exemplify the breadth of  different social and cultural practices engaged in by 
young people in intergenerational grouping across the four countries. Space restrictions 
entail that we discuss only one case per country. In the cases that follow our brief  litera-
ture review, we draw from data which includes field notes, digitally recorded individual or 
group interviews, photographs, artefacts, leaflets, flyers, music and other material provided 
by our many participatory networks. Before turning to four indicative cases drawn from 
this rich archive of  data, we interrogate existing literature to shed light on the national, 
local and regional contexts, as well as the conceptual backdrop of  this study. 
3  Shakuntala Banaji, Reading ‘Bollywood’: The Young Audience and Hindi Films (Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2016); Shakuntala Banaji, Children and Media in India: Narratives of  Class, Agency and Social Change 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2016); Shakuntala Banaji and David Buckingham, The Civic Web: 
Young People, the Internet and Civic Participation (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2013).
4  Cristina Moreno Almeida, ‘Unravelling Distinct Voices in Moroccan Rap: Evading Control, Weaving 
Solidarities, and Building New Spaces for Self-Expression’, Journal of  African Cultural Studies 25/3 (2013), 
pp. 319–332; Cristina Moreno Almeida, “Race’ and ‘Blackness’ in Moroccan Rap: Voicing Local 
Experiences of  Marginality’, in Alex Lubin and Marwan M. Kraidy (eds), American Studies Encounters the 
Middle East (Chapel Hill: The University of  North Carolina Press, 2016), pp. 81–105; Cristina Moreno 
Almeida, ‘The Politics of  Taqlidi Rap: Reimagining Moroccanness in the Era of  Global Flows’, The 
Journal of  North African Studies 21/1 (2016), pp. 116–131; Cristina Moreno Almeida, ‘Reporting on Selec-
tive Voices of  ‘Resistance’: Secularism, Class and ‘Islamist’ Rap’, International Journal of  Cultural Studies 
(2017), pp. 1–16.
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Spaces for Everyday Youth Participation: Governmentality, 
Patronage and the Festivalisation of Culture
In Tunisia, Morocco and the UAE, the state – headed by monarchies in the case of  the 
latter two – is a major patron of  the arts.5 This investment includes support not only of 
music, cinema and theatre, but also of  sports. According to Amara’s study,6 the Maghreb7 
actively promotes sports for a variety of  reasons, including social control and the promotion 
of  patriotism. In Morocco, culture is supported through foundations and associations, as 
well as through the Ministry of  Culture. These cultural foundations are headed by prom-
inent members of  the makhzen (the Moroccan elite), as is the case with the Association 
Maroc Culture in charge of  organising the Mawazine Festival, the largest music festival in 
the country. In this way, the monarchy is able to control the field of  culture – including its 
main ideas and motifs and its winners and losers  – while presenting itself  as a supporter 
of  the arts. The state’s promotion of  arts and sport is thus directly linked to cultural con-
trol of  both elite and common cultural symbols and fields. By being the major patron of 
the arts, the state ensures the selection of  sportspeople and cultural stakeholders that will 
be funded, thus defining the cultural narrative. Here we have a clear instantiation of  the 
working of  hegemony, as outlined by Antonio Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks.8 Civil society 
is ruled through a form of  cultural control that wins consent from a majority of  the pop-
ulation to the strategic priorities and ideological views and needs of  the ruling elites. In 
the process, the ideas and beliefs of  the majority are shaped, without direct coercion, and 
space for dissent or revolution diminishes. Music and sports are organised through large 
yearly events that grant visibility to the patrons but fail to promote everyday participation. 
Taieb Belghazi uses the concept of  the ‘festivalisation’ of  urban spaces to argue that 
Moroccan authorities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have turned to 
organising festivals as a major component in their cultural policy.9 These festivals serve 
both to mark the cultural field and to attract tourists via an invitation to indulge in spec-
tacle. Attempts at reproducing cultural hegemony are clearly evidenced through music 
festivals in Morocco, which are typically supervised by figures close to the state.10 Further, 
social class plays a notable role in the ways in which access to festivals is divided. While 
some venues are unaffordable to the majority of  the population, other events take place 
5  Fadma Aït Mous and Mohamed Wazif, ‘Summer Festivals in Morocco: International Influence and 
a Factor of  Social Cohesion’, IEMed Yearbook (2008), pp. 295–299; Said Graiouid and Taeib Belghazi, 
‘Cultural Production and Cultural Patronage in Morocco: The State, the Islamists, and the Field of 
Culture’, Journal of  African Cultural Studies 25/3 (2013), pp. 261–274.
6  Mahfoud Amara, Sport, Politics and Society in the Arab World (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
7  The Maghreb includes Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania and Libya. 
8  Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (New York City: Columbia University Press, 1975).
9  Taeib Belghazi, ‘Festivalization of  Urban Space in Morocco’, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 
15/1 (2006), pp. 97–107 at pp. 101–102.
10  Ibid., p. 102; Moreno Almeida, ‘Unravelling Distinct Voices in Moroccan Rap’, p. 320.
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in public squares where attendance is free.11 Such a use of  urban spaces ensures the pres-
ence of  large numbers, increasing the visibility of  the event. At the same time, it raises 
the question of  whether mere attendance constitutes participation, and if  the answer is yes, divides 
this apparent participation across socio-economic classes. Showing the success of  such 
hegemonising strategies, festivals are in general well-received by the majority of  the local 
population, as these yearly events are a time where urban spaces are transformed into 
cultural venues.
There is general agreement among scholars that civil society organisations in the MENA 
region are often used by states as a tool for social control.12 Regimes closely monitor 
civil society organisations, favouring those that help build the state’s desired image and 
disseminate its agenda. Indeed, while our case studies of  young activists explore groups 
that champion non-aligned and independent thought and action in the arenas of  music, 
football, gender and cultural production, even many women’s organisations in the region 
exemplify a co-opted relationship with either the state or religious authority. Indeed, 
according to Krause13 ‘[t]he state’s use of  women’s organisations as a device of  governmen-
tality14 is a phenomenon across the Middle East’. In our experience, women’s networks in 
the UAE were reluctant to relate to us other than through state-sanctioned routes, for fear 
of  surveillance. But what of  other arenas for participation, cultural networks, especially in 
sport? Are these too almost entirely the domain of  external control and managed partici-
pation? And how do young people negotiate and build counter-hegemonic positions with 
respect to cultural spaces, and their favourite games and music genres?
Independent Youth Networks as Civic Cultures
Jordan: Cultural Spaces
As discussed above, spectacular once-a-year events promoted by the state for tourism and 
soft power purposes fail to engage young people at neighbourhood level, or to invest in 
talent. Jordanian theatre festivals suffer from the same curse of  state intervention. Several 
yearly theatre festivals have become part of  the cultural ecology of  Jordan. The Jerash 
Festival for Culture and the Arts, founded by Yarmouk University in 1981, started as 
11  Belghazi, ‘Festivalization of  Urban Space in Morocco’, p. 107.
12  On Morocco and Jordan see Francesco Cavatorta and Vincent Durac, Civil Society and Democratization 
in the Arab World: The Dynamics of  Activism (London and New York: Routledge, 2001). On the UAE see 
Wanda Krause, Women in Civil Society: The State, Islamism, and Networks in the UAE (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), p. 49. On Jordan see Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Civil Society as Social Control: State 
Power in Jordan’, Comparative Politics 33/1 (2000), pp. 43–61.
13  Krause, Women in Civil Society, p.59.
14  Coined by Michel Foucault, the term ‘governmentality’ indicates the way a state exercises control 
over its population allowing the creation of  ‘docile bodies’ within this population to be used by eco-
nomic and political institutions. See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of  the Prison (New 
York: Random House, 1977).
Shakuntala Banaji & Cristina Moreno Almeida 11 
an independently funded festival supported by an independent non-profit organisation.15 
Another independently sponsored festival is the Amman International Theatre Festival, 
which is organised and managed by the theatre company Al Fawanees. Here, avoiding 
state funding is a sign of  artistic and political independence – and aware of  this, the state 
is at pains to shut down funding options. In 1999, the Amman International Theatre Fes-
tival was boycotted by the state who cited the dangers of  receiving foreign (read: Israeli) 
funding. While both Carslon and Wilson connect the festival’s boycott and cancelation 
with the influence of  the political tension between Jordan and Israel, such a strategy also 
fits in with the common blueprint of  states claiming control of  political discourses by lim-
iting funding of  cultural events. 16  
The field of  cultural events and spaces proves to be a fruitful ground both for the promo-
tion of  particular ideological interests and for the struggle between state and civil society 
over people’s everyday cultural activities and beliefs.  In this context, the cultural café 
Jadal in Amman, which neither seeks nor receives government funding, displays many 
attributes of  offline civic participation networks. It was started by an individual, Fadi, 
with the aim of  providing space for free thought, debate, networking and cultural critique 
through lectures and discussions. As he explains:
The idea came from my belief  in the importance of  cultural action and initiative, 
because I could see a kind of  crisis in the consciousness of  people who joined the 
hirak17… Jadal offers a space for young people to express themselves, a space for 
them to launch their social initiatives, and a space to build dialogue between people. 
The space is used for film screenings and music events, but also simply as a space for young 
Jordanians, as well as Syrian and Palestinian exiles, to hang out, chat and have coffee. 
Here, things like critical theory could be taught to groups of  up to 10 students at a time in 
a relaxed and respectful manner, unlike that of  a ‘real university’. The charismatic young 
people who staff  the café are mainly volunteers, and herein lies the rub: without sustained 
funding or state funding, it places an almost impossible financial and emotional burden on 
its founder. Increasingly, as its reputation grows online – it is rated on TripAdvisor and has 
Facebook and Twitter accounts – it is becoming a hub for Western travellers; and this has 
perhaps pushed out some of  the local patrons.18 Although some of  these Westerns have 
sympathetic political and social values, others are merely looking for a ‘cool hangout’ that 
caters to their needs. The dilemma facing civic spaces such as Jadal, then, is one of  com-
munication and community within financial insecurity. Without an organic community 
15  Marvin Carlson, ‘Theatre Festivals in the Arab World’, Contemporary Theatre Review 13/4 (2003), pp. 
42–47 at p. 46. Available at www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1048680032000118396.
16  The festival was in fact suspended in 1982 and 2006 because of  Israeli military operations. See Kate 
Wilson, ‘Cultural Collateral Damage: The Cancellation of  Jordan’s Jerash Festival 2006’, Journal of 
Dramatic Theory and Criticism 23/1 (2006), pp. 93–113; Carlson, ‘Theatre Festivals in the Arab World’, 
pp. 42–47.
17  One of  Jordan’s ‘Arab Spring’ movements.
18  At least according to some interviewees in a mobile book network, the effect of  having White people 
in the space provided by Jadal, has been to make the space seem ‘snobbish’ and exclusive. 
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from which to draw, it needs a constant flow of  customers to survive; and communi-
ty-building is difficult when those who frequent the venue are transient, or uninterested in 
local cultural and political concerns. 
Morocco: Football and the ‘Ultras’
In sports, big events serve to entrench a generally hegemonic discourse of  social and cul-
tural development via the appearance of  an investment in youth. In Morocco and Tunisia, 
this apparent support for sporting activities is in stark contrast to the actual economic and 
political actions that are put in place to bring about young people’s participation. Such 
contradictions cause ongoing debates on media outlets, in particular at times of  global 
sporting events such as the Olympic Games.19 An exception to the argument about a lack 
of  independent public networks for participation is the everyday culture of  football. Foot-
ball matches, from professional leagues to amateurs playing in the street, take place on a 
regular basis. The significance of  football in the political field of  the MENA region may be 
read through the social and political power of  the ultras. Ultras are football fans renowned 
for their ultra-fanatic support of  their clubs. Their support is materialised in songs, tifos20 
and other cultural expressions. These groups are significant to our work for two reasons: 
first, they are an example of  opportunities for everyday youth participation in the cultural 
field; and second, they embody unsupervised networks of  participation, both from elder 
family members and from the state and the clubs they support. On the one hand, they nor-
mally remain economically independent from the state and thus partly avoid its control, 
and on the other hand they keep their distance from the clubs’ management.21 
Ahmed, one of  the ultras interviewed in Salé, Morocco, exemplifies the passion involved 
in the network’s activities surrounding his team: ‘It is impossible to like the beauty of 
football without loving the beauty of  fans’. Sohail, another ultra, exclaims ‘the fans create 
the match!’, and yet another says ‘ultras are in our blood’. However, these and other inter-
viewees from the ultras network explain that the content of  the slogans, songs, banners 
and tifos are a mixture of  passion for the team and political and social messaging address-
ing social injustice. The massive logistical preparation involved in going to matches and in 
assuring the safety and security of  those who attend and travel together, has been made 
even more complex by the fact that the ultras have been recently banned in Morocco. 
This means that de facto the state does not distinguish between fans and hooligans. This 
has led the ultras groups to politically organise themselves and to boycott the matches 
played, even by the teams they support. Their preparations take place in multiple offline 
locations such as abandoned lots, factories or yards – space is needed for production of 
the tifos for each game – as well as via computer software that map out the stadium seating 
onto the bits of  plastic to be painted by ultras with unique messages. Creativity abounds 
19  Amara, Sport, Politics and Society in the Arab World, p.83.
20  Tifo is the Italian word for the phenomenon of  supporting a sport team. Here, it is a choreography 
displayed by fans in the stands of  an arena or stadium.
21  Connor T. Jerzak, ‘Ultras in Egypt: State, Revolution, and the Power of  Public Space’, Interface 5/2 
(2013), pp. 240–262 at p. 242.
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both online and offline with musicians, singers and those technologically savvy, composing 
and playing songs to be uploaded on YouTube; and graphic artists and computer scientists 
working out how to manage the huge tifos ahead of  matches. Notably, there is a paradox 
to the creativity displayed that arises from the wish to dissolve the individual in the spirit of 
the network: Artists remain anonymous, when filmed, they wear masks, stand in the dark 
or have their faces digitally blurred. Not only does this protect them from surveillance, 
it also ensures their individual talent does not overshadow the team, the ultras and the 
cause. ‘Everyone is the same’, as Sohail put it. 
As for the content of  these messages – while they are sometimes national – their referenc-
ing of  poverty, corruption and disillusionment with the ruling party, helps them resonate 
internationally. Mohamed, another interviewee, asserts that ‘we supported the Palestinian 
cause, and when Iraq was invaded, we were among the first to [protest against it]’. Large 
banners, with messages and symbols of  different ultra groups, are now banned; without 
them the ultras will not enter stadia. Consequently, ‘only common people (i.e. non-ultras 
or ‘normal’ fans) actually watch matches live’, with a strict police presence. While the 
police are a much-distrusted symbol of  the state, some ultras still see their presence as 
necessary to discourage crowd violence and unruliness. The mainstream media, however, 
are uniformly despised for being sensationalist and for failing to represent the views and 
values of  ultras accurately. This creates a space for alternative YouTube channels, such as 
the Winners’ Proxydotcom, where loyal fans can get their true messages and intentions out 
to the world. 
Of  course, being political or even dissident in one way, does not mean that an organ-
isation or network is free of  prejudice in other areas, as the story of  female fan Sara 
attests. Raised in a Wydad fans family, for her ‘supporting is a necessity’ and her passion 
for football and her team is undeniable: ‘What made me love the team even more is the 
feeling you get when you are with the fans in the stadium, if  you go to the stadium you 
feel safe…’ However, her account also exposed the sexism of  male ultras in Morocco. 
Women are simply not accepted as ultra members and are not allowed to officially join 
as members: their participation is repeatedly denigrated and policed. Fandom, such as 
wearing merchandise, is discouraged in public, and girls who do so can be shamed. Sara 
keeps in touch with her favoured team through a mix of  risk-taking and invisibility. She 
sneaks out to stadiums and matches with family friends who agree to take her, or looks 
out for updates on WhatsApp, Facebook and YouTube. However, she has also managed 
to convince some male relatives of  the significance of  her participation, although she is 
herself  somewhat elusive when asked if  women should be allowed in the ultras. Sara’s 
account was confirmed, with neither critique nor irony, by all the male ultras interviewed. 
While ‘everyone is the same’ as Sohail claims, that everyone only refers to men. It also 
requires significant time and capital investment and a phenomenal degree of  persistence, 
organisation and loyalty. This loyalty itself, including loyalty to values of  parity between 
men, love of  the pure game above profit, and exclusion of  women who ‘weaken’ support, 
entails a subterranean form of  governmentality that competes with that of  the state. 
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Tunisia: Gamers
The gaming sector in Tunisia is diffuse and unstructured. The community of  gamers is 
dispersed, with no single group or initiative in control. Some statistics concerning games 
can be found on the page of  the Tunisian Association of  Gamers (TAG).22 However, since 
this was gathered via Facebook questionnaires, it tends to exclude those who do not go 
online and have offline consoles. Getting an accurate picture of  gender and age balances 
in this community is therefore fairly complex, compared, to the ultras for example, which 
have been previously documented, or to Jadal which is a small initiative. Our qualita-
tive interviews yielded insights that are worth following up via wider surveys. If  we take 
into account the TAG’s classification of  occasional gamers, active gamers and passionate 
gamers, it could be said that our interviewees are all active or even passionate gamers, 
groups which are apparently, respectively 78,000 (active gamers) and 2,000 (passionate 
gamers) in Tunisia. 
One of  our young interviewees, Aymen, a ‘veteran’ and professional gamer by his own 
account, has been playing video games for over 10 years. Having begun to play at the age 
of  seven, he got immersed in gaming and is thinking of  starting a game-related project. 
As a professional gamer and YouTube star,23 Aymen receives sponsorship from famous 
gaming companies. Apart from playing games, reviewing games on YouTube, and par-
ticipating in tournaments and championships, Aymen has participated in dubbing games 
from English to Arabic, yet another way to reach out to a wider audience. In Aymen’s 
discussion, the wider unknown audience consists of  gamers across the globe and is not 
limited to young people or to Tunisians. However, some of  the other interviewees such as 
Manel suggest that offline, local gaming networks are as important to them as virtual and 
online ones. 
Inducted into gaming at a very young age by her brother who was four years older than 
her, and beginning with Pokemon and World of  Warcraft, Manel now plays as part of  the 
League of  Legends community: ‘Sometimes we would meet and play in a cyber (café) with 
excellent connections and high spec computers’. Here, gender discrimination abounds 
and, in our view, for women and girls pushes what seem like a simple leisure pastime over 
the line into a form of  civic action: 
Maybe the hardest thing to face is actually to get into the guys’ team. Most of 
them would say ‘You are a girl. You cannot play’. Once you get into a team, they 
would always look at you as a girl and not as a good player… I play because I 
want to get good at the game as a person, as a gamer, not as a girl, but at the same 
time I really want to say that ‘I am a girl! And I am as good as the boys…’
22  See Tunisian Association of  Gamers’ Website. Available at http://tagtun.org/statistiques-sur-le-
sport-en-tunisie/4/.
23  See Aymen’s Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/RodnDjok/ and his Youtube channel: 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCcoPo_cAZxtUvWV2z2g5ILg.
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Another female interviewee, Narjakh, belongs to an online network called the Tunisian 
Girl Gamers (TGG). Despite being exclusively online, TGG has helped members to get to 
know each other, to share experiences related to gender and gaming, and to gather both 
online and offline with each other. The feminist collective CHAML, an online blog related 
to women’s rights, has recently posted an article about TGG. Narjakh, as well as other 
girl gamers that our RA Sara spoke to, agreed that girl gamers are usually looked down at 
or underestimated when they play online in mixed groups. They recounted having been 
insulted, kicked out of  a game, and verbally harassed on a gaming platform, at least once. 
Several mentioned a constant struggle which aligns with much global criticism of  gaming 
communities. Nevertheless, these young women’s will to prove themselves, to improve 
their skills as players, and to navigate game worlds appeared undimmed. And herein lies 
a key point that applies far more widely than just in Tunisia: youth cultural activity and 
civic organisation is not perfect, either online or offline.24 We refute a simple culturalist 
argument that might identify this particular form of  patriarchal control of  online space 
or networked activity as exceptional to the MENA region, although it is clearly inflected 
by local gender relations. Female gamers in Tunisia are trapped within and work against 
similar misogynist logics to those that are present in gamer communities in Europe and 
North America. Even when set up to protest one kind of  injustice, or to advocate equality 
and creativity in a particular sphere, the cultural and media production, leisure ethos and 
social values of  particular civic networks generally reflect the conflicting contexts, strug-
gles and prejudices of  participants.  
UAE: Cultural Networks 
In the UAE, the state appears to have become aware of  the branding power of  culture 
somewhat later than in the other countries researched here, as it has primarily been con-
cerned with the tourism and construction industries.25 As Syed Ali argues, the reason 
behind this is a lack of  appreciation for ‘the potential of  arts as commerce and as a 
branding device’.26 Emiratis make up only 10 percent of  the population of  the UAE, and 
despite the fact that they depend on the labour of  the other 90 percent, they feel them-
selves ‘under siege from an ever-increasing foreign majority, and find that their culture 
is diminishing in importance in public spaces’.27 Recently, the government has turned to 
hosting festivals – cinema, comics, music, shopping and heritage – as a way to monitor, 
organise and spectacularise culture. These festivals celebrate Emirati culture and heritage 
including dance, music, storytelling, cookery, horse and camel-riding, as well as other 
themes such as chess or rock music. Here too, social class plays a key role. While open-
air spaces embodied in the idea of  the ‘Arab street’ have traditionally been considered 
as quintessential spaces of  participation in the MENA region, in Dubai, open-air public 
spaces such as patches of  grass are marginal,28 while indoor malls and consumer culture 
24  Banaji and Buckingham, The Civic Web.
25  Syed Ali, Dubai: Gilded Cage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 66. 
26  Ibid., p. 73.
27  Ibid., p. 144. 
28  Ibid., p. 9.
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embody the meeting arena of  the privileged. In contrast to our other cases, in the UAE, 
cultural activities are organised mainly in closed private spaces reserved for the elite and 
aimed at branding the country for foreigners.
Nevertheless, even with the dearth of  open-air spaces, there is a growing network of  artists 
and practitioners in the UAE. Our interviews with fairly well-to-do independent musi-
cians, music promoters, art activists and poetry slam organisers in the UAE suggest that 
a range of  strategies and opportunities for performance are deliberately being developed 
outside of  the state networks. Unlike the gamers in Tunisia or the ultras in Morocco, 
most individuals in this network stem from wealthy families, and the network itself  is not 
‘grassroots’. Indeed, as with many other networks in the country, our research suggests 
that performances take place primarily within private homes, or other privately hired 
spaces. Since space is such a political issue and rates of  internet penetration are high 
amongst the social groups they inhabit, all interviewees stress the significance of  internet 
tools in allowing them to connect with, select, promote, advertise, and carefully celebrate 
young musicians and artists. Although their aim is ultimately to have a physical space of 
their own where they can be based, Sali Elagab, the co-founder of  an independent and 
unfunded space ‘The Green Room’ tells us that already ‘there’s a community sense to the 
Green Room’:
The Green Room is a moving platform for young independent musicians in the 
UAE. It showcases young artists … [we have a set database of  artists which is 
growing every day] and we go from one venue to another. … We really want to 
nurture the music scene in Sharjah and the UAE more generally.
We note that the language here maintains an ambivalent relationship between civil society 
cultural production and the state’s desire to brand the UAE as a nation through culture. 
The Green Room, while clearly not falling into the category of  an organisation that hosts 
festivals or artists on behalf  of  the state, and in some ways an autonomous network in 
contrast to the state-sponsored activities, is also conscious of  cultural production’s position 
vis-à-vis the nation.
While their website provides their main online resource and they do sometimes get cold 
calls or approaches at venues, communication primarily takes place via personal email, 
Facebook pages – both group and personal – YouTube and Snapchat. In addition to 
providing venues and promotion for young musicians with no connection to the state, the 
Green Room also runs songwriting and performance workshops, based on people’s needs 
or requests, as well as one-off  poetry slams, performance nights and stand-up comedy. At 
times, they collaborate with another ‘trendy’ new organisation, Freshly Ground Sounds, 
which somewhat disingenuously promotes itself  as the only ‘scene’ for young musicians 
in the UAE, and is most popular with fairly wealthy Emiratis and expats. We gathered, 
however, that while personal tragedy, self-reflection and social angst are explored across 
this scene, overtly political questions and messages are excluded from performances at 
the Green Room and certainly do not enter the lyrics of  most artists at Freshly Ground 
Sounds. Most of  the artists, aware of  local codes, of  surveillance and of  other possible 
repercussions, either perform elsewhere or self-censor their lyrics, poetry and comedy. 
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In this sense, the music network scene here is quite distinct from that in European countries, 
or even in Morocco and Jordan. This self-censorship has implications for the connections 
between autonomous political or civic activism in the UAE and the state’s sphere of  influ-
ence: even in the rare spaces where cultural acts are not directly policed, they are to a 
certain extent inflected by understandings of  surveillance, acceptability and risk. 
Conclusion
There is a plethora of  creative energy going into building and maintaining artistic, 
socio-political and other cultural networks amongst young people and cross generation-
ally in the MENA region. Across the four contrasting countries, we found civic networks 
and participation in arenas as diverse as cooking and political philosophy, football, gaming 
and LGBTQI rights. Many of  the networks were clearly nested in the histories of  polit-
ical and civic participation of  each of  the countries. Notably, although we specifically 
interviewed young people aged between 15 and 35, several of  the networks consisted of 
intergenerational teams or large diffuse movements (for example the ultras), and where 
they were uniformly involving the young, these young tended to be more homogenous in 
terms of  social class – i.e. being primarily from high-income families and/or college-go-
ing and educated (for example Jadal and the Green Room). While new media has clearly 
entered the sphere of  civic networks, assisting active members in communicating easily 
and quickly with each other, in seeking information about new members and, at times, in 
facilitating the central activities in crucial ways, almost all of  the networks we looked at 
across the project and notably the ones we discuss in this paper consist of  a major portion 
of  offline interactions. In fact, the idea of  physical space, either public or private, and of 
such space as an arena for the discussion and exhibition of  political or social views and 
values, was central to most of  the networks. 
Further, analysing young people’s political, artistic, sporting and musical cultures in the 
MENA region through the lenses of  media use and participation sheds new light on the 
way the region’s youth engage socially and politically. While there is much to emulate 
and admire about the networks, exclusions and hierarchies do persist in many of  them, 
and hegemonic identities creep in. Thus, a practice, network or movement can be a pro-
gressive force in one arena, such as access to cultural production outside the state sector, 
while remaining a regressive force with regards to gender, social class, or religious iden-
tities. An anxiety about the commodification of  the self  and of  civic initiatives – and 
about having too many dull, meaningless or negative interactions – was mentioned by 
some young people as being the reason why they do not use social media heavily. The 
ability to communicate an event or idea quickly with many was the reason that some 
went online despite a personal preference not to do so. Certainly, economic power stands 
at the intersection between media, culture and participation whether on or offline, and 
patriarchal gender norms that are inflected by the local contexts but not exclusive to the 
region remain a key barrier for young women’s entry into cultural and political spaces. In 
the case of  gender, young men appear to take on the role of  policing cultural and political 
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spaces, which one might argue has been vacated by – or taken from – the state. This allows 
us to make the further point that governmentality is not something confined to governing 
elites or to bureaucratic structures, and that equally profound habits and effects are felt in 
intersubjective relationships between citizens in the MENA region. 
Across the MENA region and in our four chosen countries, elites play an important role 
in controlling the cultural field and accumulating power through their dominant position, 
including with regards to national mainstream media. These elites have shown a pref-
erence for certain types of  large spectacular events and cultural practices. Yet, there are 
instances where these elites do not – or cannot  – control and organise youth participation 
as amongst the ultras in Morocco, alternative cultural spaces in Jordan and gamers in 
Tunisia. The networks examined here, while in many ways retaining the class-biased or 
patriarchal codes of  wider society, organise themselves not only regardless of  the elites’ 
dominant power but also independent of  parental supervision. In doing this, those young 
– sometimes working class and lower middle class – people get a chance to support their 
favourite football team or play in international online game tournaments, and in turn 
engage in different, and sometimes extreme, instances of  local and national social and 
political issues. The different examples presented here problematise the notion of  par-
ticipation as a simple social good and of  social networks as primarily pertaining to the 
internet arena. They unravel the play of  power in political, artistic, sporting and musical 
cultures, establishing connections and disconnections between the countries that form our 
case studies. 
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